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THE GOVERNOR'S POWER TO REMOVE COUNTY
OFFICIALS.
On the night of January 30, 1925, a fight occurred in a pool
room in the city of Hazard. The sheriff and one of his deputies
went to the pool room. When they arrived the fighting had
ceased, but the participants were threatening to renew it. The
sheriff, who was in an intoxicated condition, dispersed the crowd
by ejecting every one from the pool room. He did this in a
rough and violent manner, shoving, pushing, and peremptorily
ordering them out, hitting several with his pistol, kicking at
one, and striking a crippled boy over the head with his pistol,
producing an ugly wound. The boy at the time was a spectator,
sitting on a stool, and taking no part in the difficulty. After
the crowd was dispersed, the sheriff went out upon the street,
and engaged in a controversy with a policeman, in which he
cursed the entire police force, and roundly abused and offered
to fight the policeman, -who had formerly been a deputy sheriff
under him, and who had been discharged and later employed
as a policeman; this boisterous and indecent conduct being continued until friends persuaded the sheriff to desist. Under these
facts, has the governor of the state the power to remove the
sheriff, a county official?
On March 5, 1925, the governor of the state, after proceedings held pursuant to the act of June 18, 1924, and based on the
facts above recited and other charges not necessary to be set
forth here, issued an order removing the sheriff from his office.
On July 14, 1925, the Court of Appeals cancelled the order and
dismissed the charges on the ground that the governor has no
power to remove a sheriff from office except for "neglect of
duty" and that the facts recited above did not constitute
"neglect of duty." On October 13, 1925, a rehearing was
denied.'
It must first be recognized that the court in deciding a
law ease cannot consider the practical expediency or the abstract
justice of the result that may be reached. The law by fixed
judicial decision or by legislative enactment or by constitutional
Holicay v. Fields, Governor, 210 Ky. 179, 275 S. W. 642.
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limitation may be so clearly established that the court has no
alternative to the simple declaration of the rule as it finds it
written, however reluctant it may be to apply that rule to the
particular facts in hand. Consequently when a judicial decision has been announced that shocks the common sense of justice
and leads to a somewhat general questioning of the effectiveness
of popular government, the critic will not infrequently find that
the root of the difficulty rests in some legislative ineptitude of
phrase or intent rather than in the judicial decision. On the
other hand, it sometimes happens that a court, in its earnest
search for the true rule of law under the Constitution and the
statute passed in pursuance thereof, may take up an interpretation that would in effect defeat the purposes of a constitutional
provision, although it may conform letter by letter to the words
used in the fundamental law. In such a case, it is not beyond
the bounds of propriety for members of the bar and citizens
generally to indicate their dissatisfaction with a too mechanical
observance of old definitions in the interpretation of the Constitution, which of necessity is a living thing. "The letter killeth,
but the spirit giveth life," is a maxim not unknown to the
courts, and its importance is seldom overlooked by the judiciary.
To understand the Holliday case, it is first important to
note that the Constitution of Kentucky provides as follows:
"Judges of the county court, justices of the peace, sheriffs, coroners, surveyors, jailers, assessors, county attorneys and conatables shall be subject to indictment or prosecution for misfeasance or malfeasance in office, or willful neglect in discharge of
official duties, in such mode as may be prescribed by law; and
upon conviction his office shall become vacant, but such officer
2
shall have the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals."1
By chapter 62 of the Acts of 1918, subsequently ratified by
the people, this provision was amended by the addition of the
following enabling clause: " The General Assembly may, in addition to the indictment or prosecution above provided, by general
law provide other manner, method or mode for the vacation of
office or the removal from office of any sheriff, jailer, constable
or peace officer, for neglect of duty, and may provide the
method, manner, or mode of reinstatement of such officers."
2

Ky. Const.,

section 227.
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The original provision called for indictment or prosecution
for (1) misfeasance in office; (2) malfeasance in office; or (3)
willful neglect in discharge of offieial duties. The amendment
gave the General Assembly power to provide other methods for
removing county officials in one case only, (1) for neglect of
duty.
There is thus presented at the outset the problem of interpreting the amendment. Did the people intend that "neglect
of duty" should include the three kinds of official wrongs mentioned in the original provision or did they intend that it should
refer to mere omissions or failures to act? The majority of the
Court of Appeals held that "neglect of duty" had the last meaning only, that the amendment created a new cause for removals
and authorized a new procedure for removals due to such cause
only. The dissenting Judges (Clarke, C. J., and Dietzman, J.),
held the intent of the amendment was to disregard all technicalities with reference to misfeasance, malfeasance or nonfeasance,
as well as neglect of official duty, and to provide the new procedure for all such cases of dereliction by county officials.
There is great variety in the phraseology of state statutes
and constitutional provisions concerning the removal of public
officers. The causes most commonly stated are malfeasance,
misfeasance, inefficiency, neglect of duty, corruption, extortion,
intoxication, and conviction of crime. The scope of the particular words used has been occasionally before the courts. Intoxication has been held not to be "misfeasance. " 3 Failure to
file a fidelity bond has been held not to be neglect of duty.4
Irregularities in the publication of statements of sums of money
allowed and in advertisements for bids and a failure to advertise
for bids have been regarded as not constituting neglect of duty,
because "the 'neglect' contemplated must disclose either wilfulness or indifference to duty so persistent or in affairs of such
importance that the safety of public interests is threatened.' '
From these examples it can be seen that the courts have been
curiously reluctant to give to provisions for the removal of pub'Comm. v. Williams, 79 Ky. 42, 42 Am. Rep. 204. Statutes frequently provide that habitual intoxication shall constitute ground for
the removal of a public officer. State v. Henderson, 145 Iowa 657, 124
N. W. 767.
4 Comm. v. Slifer, 25 Pa. St. 23, 64 Am. Dec. 680.

'State v. Kennedy, 82 Kan. 373, 108 Pac. 837.
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lie officers ample scope. They have been influenced no doubt by
the outworn fiction that a public officer has a vested right to
his office. The decision in the Holliday case excluding acts of
malfeasance and misfeasance from the single phrase "neglect of
duty" used in the amendment cannot be said to be unwarranted
by the general tendency to construe provisions for the removal
of public officers with extraordinary strictness.
It is perhaps proper, however, to call attention in this connection to the fact that a broad construction of the phrase
"neglect of duty" would have made possible an effective supervision of county officials by the responsible head of the state.
The legislative enactment that the governor shall have power to
remove an offending county official after due hearing is in line
with the unanimous opinion of political scientists that such
powers of removal are essential if state administration is to be
effectively organized and maintained. In the first book that approached the problem of state government with the purpose of
making a scientific analysis of the distribution of functions and
powers of the state, J. M. Mathews wrote as follows:6 "It was
early seen by farsighted observers that the governor's power of
removal must be extended, if he is properly to be held responsible for the conduct of the administration." With the vast
increase in the functions of state governments and the widening
of the fields where the state, as distinguished from a local unit
of government, lays down a general policy, there has been a distinct development in the direction, as Walter F. Didd has
phrased it,7 of "an increased supervision of local offices and local
governments as agents in the carrying out of state policy."
Several factors have delayed the full recognition of the
Governor's power of removal. Unlike the president, s the governor is held to have no power of removal resulting from his general executive power or incidental to his appointive power."
Constitutional limitations, express or implied, have hindered
6 Principles of Amnerican State Administration, p. 98.
7State Government (1922 ed.), p. 285. See also a discussion of responsibility in state administration in Charles A. Beard's American
Government and Politics (1924 ed.), p. 583, and . T. Youngl New
American Government (1923 ed.), p. 359.
8Parsonsv. U. S., 167 U. S. 324, 42 L. Ed. 185.
'State v. Rhame, 92 S. C. 455, 75 S. E. 881; McDonald v. Brunnett,
92 S. C. 469, 75, S. E. 873.

KENTUCKY LAW JoUmmwA

the grant of such power by the legislature. Elective officers
have often been regarded as exempt from removal, as having a
sanction in their popular election of equal validity with the
governor's own status. The removal of local officials, elected by
their local constituents, has been deemed to violate the principle
of home rule. But in spite of such obstacles, the clear tendency
is toward the enlargement of the governor's removal powers.
Everett Kimball in his work on State and Municipal Government in the United States,1 0 has clearly pointed out the
absurdity of the present situation when law enforcing agents,
police in cities, constables in villages, and sheriffs in counties,
all chosen by local agencies, but charged with the enforcement
of state statutes, have practically no responsibility to state authorities. "The governor is held responsible by law enforcement, although actually he has little power. Rarely he can
remove a sheriff." H. L. James 1 has advocated the appointment of sheriffs by the governor on the ground that most of his
duties are those of a state agent charged" with the enforcement
of state law. But he recognizes the intense opposition to any
,central control over local police officials, and the most that can
be expected at present is that while local officials will continue
to be elected, an effective power of removal will be lodged in the
governor. The decision in the Holliday case, unfortunately,
makes necessary a new constitutional amendment in this state
to give the governor this power in broad terms and thus to make
possible a unified, effective, and responsible administration of
state policies throughout the state.
Whether or not the dissenting judges are right in their
distinction between malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance
or neglect, there is no doubt that the 1924 Legislature thought
that the distinction had been blotted out. Acting on the authority it assumed had been given by the amendment, it provided:
"That if any sheriff, jailer, constable or peace officers of
this Commonwealth be guilty of gross misconduct in office,
bribery, gross neglect to enforce the laws of this Commonwealth,
gross immorality or habitual drunkenness, he shall be deemed
10State and Municipal Government in the 'UnitecZ States, ch. 9, p. 166.
" Local Government in the United States, Ch. 3.
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guilty of neglect of official duty and shall be removed from office
2
by the Governor."'
Obviously, legislative interpretations of constitutional
powers do not bind the court. But the effort to determine what
matters may now subject a county official to removal by the
governor and what may not is so difficult a task even for the
Court of Appeals that it may be doubted whether the people
in adopting the amendment had in mind any such distinctions
at all. For example, the court (majority opinion) says that
.'gross misconduct in office," may or may not involve a neglect
of duty, depending on the facts charged. Likewise, bribery is
and gross immorality may be a violation of law, but may or
may not involve a neglect of duty, depending on the circumstances. Who will draw the line? Is it not readily perceived
that the line is so shadowy (if indeed it has any existence) that
no governor will trouble himself to draw it and the law and the
constitutional amendment become dead letters by reason of the
interpretation put upon them by the court?
To follow further the majority opinion, we must grant that
the legislative act authorizing removal of county officials by the
governor is valid as to the offenses listed in the act only when
these offenses amount to "neglect of duty" and nothing more.
But is there not clear proof of neglect of duty in the facts set
forth at the beginning of this article? The majority opinion
answers in the negative with the following explanation: "Appellant's intoxication and conduct on this occasion were reprehensible, and, while not so stated in the charge, may be denominated
as gross misconduct. He may be heavily flinedl both for the assault on the boy and for the breach of peace in the Begley
episode. He is also subject to a heavy fine for being intoxicated.
The affair with Begley, the policeman, was not an official act,
and, though a disgraceful row, it does not appear that he
neglected any official duty by reason of it. The dispersal of the
crowd in the pool room appears to have been done officially, and
the attack on the boy was unlawful. It might sustain a prosecution for malfeasance in office, which upon his conviction would
automatically remove him from office, but for this he is entitled
'nChapter

49 of Acts of 1924.
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to a jury trial; it not being the character of neglect contemplated
by the amendment."
The explanation rests upon the notion that "neglect of
duty" means "neglect of official duty" as distinguished from
individual, unofficial misconduct. The distinction is thus phased
with accuracy, although with disapproval, by the dissenting
judges: "That his conduct was most reprehensible, and may be
denominated as gross misconduct, is admitted by the majority
opinion, which nevertheless holds that he cannot be removed
from office therefor, because, though drunk and acting wrongfully in the performance of an official duty in the poolroom, he
was acting diligently, and, after leaving the poolroom, he was
not acting officially, but individually, in trying to run a city
peace officer away from his post of duty and putting him in such
fear as to prevent him from arresting and lodging appellant in

jail."
What can be the explanation of a distinction so strained,
of a theory that violates the most elementary conceptions of the
obligations of a public officer? What possible excuse can there
be in this day for holding that a sheriff who immediately after
closing a poolroom curses the police force of the town and
engages in a disgraceful drunken row is nevertheless not guilty
of neglect of duty? The critic was warned at the outset that
he would find his answer in all probability in some fixed rule of
law, and here unfortunately, as it seems, the Court of Appeals
found what it regarded as a fixed rule of law, a decision of its
own, Commonwealth v. Williams.13 The court was following precedent in making the distinction here criticized, but it is submitted that the precedent itself is wrong.
In the Williams case, the removal of a county judge was
sought for the offence of misfeasance in office, and the indictment
set forth that the judge was intoxicated when an applicant came
before him as county judge to have letters of administration
issued and appraisers appointed. The court held that the phrase
"misfeasance in office" meant the wrong-doing of an official act
and that the misconduct charged in the indictment was not
official, but personal. "In this case, no complaint is made that
the appellee (judge) did not faithfully, honestly and correctly
13

Commonwealth v. Williams, 79 Ky. 42, 42 Am. Rep. 204.
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discharge all his duties as an officer." As if a drunken judge
could "faithfully" discharge the duties of his office! The dissenting judges in the Holliday case, in an opinion that boldly
challenges the correctness of the Williams' ease and the propriety
of applying its reasoning to the Holliday case, say: "Whatever
may have been the judicial view in 1880 and prior thereto about
the duties of peace officers, I feel sure that most, if not all, citizens who in 1919 voted either for or against the amendment did
so with the firm belief that it was the official duty of a peace
officer, in consonance with his oath of office, to observe the law
himself, as well as to enforce its obedience upon others. Indeed,
it seems axiomatic to me that such must always have been the
conception of good citizens everywhere, and I cannnot believe
that now or at any time since the foundation of this Commonwealth a contrary declaration was justified by enlightened publie opinion, good morals, sound judgment, or even the technicalities of the law."
However disheartening a decision like HotUday v. Commonwealth may be to those who desire a more effective administra.
tion of state government, a continuance of the present impotence of the governor to control the execution of state policies
by local officials cannot be laid to the court. A judicial decision,
There is a more
however unfortunate, need not be "recalled."
orderly remedy provided in the Constitution, the process of
amendment. The friends of a strong centralized state government should prepare a new amendment making indisputably
clear the power of the governor to remove a county official at
fault, whether his fault be malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance.
CARixs J. Tuic.
University of Kentucky, College of Law.

